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Global warming and environmental issues foster the emergence of GreenTech 
startups. To promote their creation and support their growth, a wide variety of 
institutions exist. The diversity of actors in the French GreenTech ecosystem makes 
it difficult for startups to identify the most appropriate actor at each step of their 
development and for each one of their specific needs. Bpifrance, the public bank for 
innovation in France, wishes to know how to consolidate this ecosystem. This work 
aims at providing a clear vision of the GreenTech ecosystem in France, and at 
identifying potential lacks in the support to GreenTech startups.  
 
Based on prior literature and semi-structured interviews, the study examines how 
GreenTech startups are supported by the GreenTech ecosystem in France and how 
this support could be improved. 
 
Seven GreenTech startups and twelve GreenTech institutions from various sectors 
were interviewed. Results of the discussions reveal that GreenTech startups do not 
face any specific needs compared to other startups, but struggle to find appropriate 
assistance. Three reasons explain this situation: the opacity of the GreenTech 
ecosystem, insufficient interactions between actors of this ecosystem, and a lack of 
industrial R&D facilities. 
 
A mapping of the GreenTech institutions in France, and their role at each 
development stage of a startup, delivered at the end of this study, helps to bring some 
clarity to the ecosystem. To improve the ecosystem, several recommendations are 
also given. Bpifrance can support the French GreenTech ecosystem with the creation 
of a GreenTech community, by rewarding newly formed partnerships between 
actors of the ecosystem, and by sensitizing institutions to green technologies and 
their importance. GreenTech actors should formalize further their support to 
GreenTech startups in order to measure their impact & their efficiency and offer 
more industrial R&D platforms for startups to be able to scale more rapidly. 
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Facing the growing threat of climate change, many scientists and entrepreneurs have 
been trying to take action and to offer solutions that could help humans and industries 
decrease their environmental impact, especially since the early 2000s (Goldstein, 
2018). Those initiatives are giving rise to the emergence of a specific kind of startups 
called “GreenTech”, “cleantech”, “eco-tech” or “enviro-tech” startups, which are 
created to reduce the environmental impact of human activities with new technologies 
(Hoff, 2012). 
More recently, the creation of GreenTech (GT) startups is being increasingly supported 
by governments, trying to respect their commitments and improve their emissions-
cutting efforts (Ministère de la transition écologique et solidaire, 2017). In France, 
President Emmanuel Macron claimed his will to elevate the status of France to a “start-
up nation”, with a particular focus on the cleantech sector (Macron, 2017). This 
support is reflected by the apparition of new actors, specifically dedicated to the 
assistance of GT startups, and the integration of new services in existing structures 
(Roullé, 2020). A wide variety of actors exist to foster the creation of startups: 
technology transfer organisms, laboratories, incubators, competitive poles, … All 
these actors bring specific services, and it can be hard to identify the right ones since 
the offer is very fragmented (Aré, Aractingi, Ferré, & al., 2018).  
The French public investment bank, Bpifrance, became a “bank for climate” in 2019 
and initiated a “Climate Plan” in 2020. Bpifrance wants to support the environmental 
transition by investing in GreenTech startups. Therefore, the bank wishes to know 
which GT actors are currently supporting the creation of GT startups and which role 
she can play, as a new GreenTech actor.   
This study aims at offering a clear vision of the GT ecosystem in France in order to 
understand how GreenTech actors are supporting the creation and the growth of 




The analysis of several GT startups raises the question of their specific needs. In the 
prior literature, one special requirement which has been well studied is related to 
financial funding, mainly because investing in GT startups can be a lot riskier (Baltes 
& Büchele, 2015). However, the four other aspects associated to the creation of a 
startup – business, law, product and team (Bpifrance, 2019), have been quite 
overlooked: no prior study clearly stated the presence or the absence of specific GT 
startups needs and no precise recommendation to support GT startups has been clearly 
formulated. Thus, GT actors might struggle to offer the right assistance and services 
to such startups. Moreover, discussing with numerous GT startups, it appears that the 
current French GT ecosystem is utterly opaque for them. For Bpifrance to know how 
to reinforce and complete the support of existing GT actors, the following research 
problem was addressed:  
How are GreenTech startups supported by the GreenTech ecosystem in France 
and how could this support be improved? 
The research problem was further divided into three research questions. The first 
research question is related to the context of GT startups creation. By answering this 
question, needs for the creation of GreenTech start-ups were identified. 
RQ1: Which supports do GreenTech startups need to be created? 
The second research question addresses the methods and supports currently offered to 
GreenTech startups in France. The goal is to understand which tools, infrastructures, 
utilities and resources are available for such startups, and where they can be found. 
These resources are relevant for GT startups who are looking for support, as well as 
for GT actors willing to re-direct start-ups to the right interlocutor. 
RQ2: What kind of services do GreenTech actors offer to GreenTech startups? 
The third and last research question relates to the existing collaborations between GT 
actors. The answer to this question gives clear insights into the actual French GT 
network and the interactions between GT actors. It underlines a lack of interactions 
between some GT actors, which could be strengthened.  




To answer these questions and address the research problem, an inductive qualitative 
research was conducted. Prior studies as well as general information found in the 
websites of GreenTech actors were used as a basis for this study. However, the absence 
of clear information about the structure and organization of the French GreenTech 
ecosystem justified the choice of an inductive qualitative research. Data was collected 
through organic research and interviews of two types of actors: GreenTech startups 
and GreenTech actors. 11 GT actors and 5 GreenTech startups were interviewed 
through semi-conducted interviews of the length of thirty minutes each, without 
recording. GreenTech actors were selected among six of the seven main GreenTech 
actors’ categories identified in the literature review. Thus, interviewees were 
individuals in charge of the development of GT startups within their structure, and 
CEOs of GreenTech startups. For the GT actors, interviewees were selected among the 
main types of actors in the French entrepreneurial ecosystem: incubators, TTOs, 
SATTs, Carnot Institutes, competitive pole and technological poles; and among actors 
possessing expertise in one GT sector at least (energy, environment, mobility & 
transport, agriculture & agrifood, durable construction, green chemistry & 
biomaterials). Therefore, the findings of the study are of high relevance for any GT 
actors willing to play a role in the French GT ecosystem. 
This study has several results. First, it shows that GreenTech startups have the same 
needs as DeepTech startups. Thus, no specific GreenTech startups needs exist: the only 
specific needs they have are related to their highly technological character. Second, 
the GreenTech ecosystem in France is still under construction: the roles of each actor 
are unclear for Greentech startups, and interactions between actors are rare. Finally, 
there is a lack of industrial platforms or centers that GreenTech startups could use in 
their pre-industrial phase, to scale up; and a lack of a real GT community on which GT 
startups could rely on to share good practices, get advice from peers and to be inspired. 
Initially, this study was commissioned by Bpifrance. Thus, it gives some 
recommendations to the company, to strengthen the French GT ecosystem by being a 
part of it and by fostering interactions between GT actors. The study also serves the 
needs of French GT startups and GT actors. For the former, the findings and discussion 
help to identify the right GT actors able to support them along their different 




convey to GT startups, and recommendations offer them some clues to improve their 
support.  
After this introduction chapter, comes a literature review consisting in two chapters. 
First, the development process of GT startups is explored, with the description of the 
development path for generic startups and the definition of the term “GreenTech”, 
uncovering some needs labeled as specific to GT startups by prior literature (Chapter 
2). Second, basic notions to understand the structure of an entrepreneurial ecosystem 
are given, and the main actors of the French GT entrepreneurial ecosystem as well as 
a snapshot of GT startups in France are described (Chapter 3). The empirical section 
forms the third part of the study and describes the role of 11 GT actors in the French 
GT ecosystem as well as the various needs of 5 French GT startups. The fourth chapter 
reports the methodologic choices determined from literature review’s results. 
Following the data structure described in Figure 8 & Figure 9, the sixth chapter 
exposes the findings of the study, based on the interviews. In this chapter, the three 
research questions of the thesis are addressed. The discussion section reveals the lacks 
in the French GreenTech ecosystem and gives recommendations to Bpifrance and GT 
actors to improve this ecosystem. Finally, Chapter 7 serves as a conclusion of the 









2. How to create a GreenTech startup 
 
GreenTech startups, like any other startups must go through several stages before 
addressing the market and then expand. This chapter exposes the generic path for 
startup development and defines the term “GreenTech”, before focusing on needs, 
challenges and obstacles faced by GreenTech startups in particular. 
2.1 Generic startup development 
 
Although each entrepreneur’s journey has its own particularities, the Boston 
Consulting Group (BCG) identifies five typical steps for the development of a startup 
(The Boston Consulting Group, 2018), from the emergence of the innovative idea to 
the international growth. These five steps are depicted in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Five steps for startup development 
Before going deeper in the description of these five phases, it is crucial to keep in mind 
that the startup creation process is, at the beginning, iterative. The ideation and creation 
phases are usually repeated several times before the product or service offered by the 
startup truly matches customers’ needs and desires. The lean startup method developed 
by Eric Ries (Ries, 2012) and the design thinking method (Martin, 2009) describe how 
to rapidly test the market and to adjust the product based on customers’ feedbacks, 
repeatedly, until the offer finds its market. The linear description of startup 
development was chosen here for a better understanding of the entrepreneur’s needs. 
Each one of the five stages described by the BCG can be characterized by a certain 
objective and distinct requirements in terms of business, team, legal aspects and 







The first step is related to the structuration and validation of the innovative idea. The 
entrepreneur must define, and test with potential customers, the strategic positioning 
of the offer as well as a first business model (Riel, Neumann, & Tichkiewitch, 2013). 
If needed, the technical feasibility has to be validated by experts. Of course, an 
entrepreneur is rarely alone but if he or she is, a cofounder should be found at this very 
first stage. This first small team must present complementary profiles: in the fashion 
sector for instance, the team should include a creative and a business profile. The main 
guidelines of the shareholders agreement can also be defined, when the cofounders 




• Validation of the idea 
• First Business Model 
Team • Complementary cofounders 
Legal aspects • Shareholders agreement 
Finance • Personal money 
 
Creation 
The creation of the startup comes as the second step of the process. At the business 
level, the idea must turn into a concrete offer. To reach this objective, a Minimum 
Viable Product, or MVP, must be created and tested with the first customers (The 
Boston Consulting Group, 2018). As the BCG explains, the MVP is the simplest 
version of the product or service, which presents the basic functionalities to satisfy 
customers. This product is essential to rapidly confront the market and collect 
customers’ feedbacks which will help refine the offer and select the first commercial 
target to address (Salamzadeh & Kawamorita Kesim, 2015). At this stage, essential 
skills that will be needed for the development of the startup must be defined (The 
Boston Consulting Group, 2018). These skills can be either externalized or 




case, the cofounders should identify key partners but also mentors to constitute the 
first governance board. In the second case, new team members and interns are 
recruited.  When it comes to legal requirements, the startup becomes a new venture 
with a legal structure. Sometimes, the intellectual property must be protected to secure 
the competitive advantage of the offer before it reaches the market. To finance all these 
developments, the cofounders can raise money among friends & family, and 
sometimes receive subventions from the government. 
CREATION 
Business • MVP 
Team 
• Key skills are identified and 
outsourced or internalized 
Legal aspects 
• Creation of the venture 
• Intellectual Property 
Finance 




With the third stage, comes the famous “Proof of Concept” or PoC (The Boston 
Consulting Group, 2018). In other words, the moment when market traction can be 
assessed and possibly validated for the first time. If customers give positive feedbacks, 
the first prototype (MVP) can be enriched with new functionalities. Nonetheless, first 
feedbacks mostly lead to a pivot: the business model is changed and adapted, 
accordingly to customers’ feedbacks (Ries, 2012). When the business model finally 
meets customers’ needs and desires, first clients are capitalized and first key 
performance indicators (KPIs) can be evaluated, in order to refine customer acquisition 
and retention strategies. At this moment, to ensure rapid growth, startups usually need 
more money than their sole revenues (The Boston Consulting Group, 2018). The BCG 
explains that various ways exist to find this money: bank loans, public funding such 
as honor loans, fundraising, public or private investors, etc. Each possibility displays 




entrepreneur, as well as the contract’s terms and clauses. This fresh money enables the 
recruitment of key profiles in the startup teams: a sales director in a fashion brand for 
instance. Finding the right profile, with sufficient skills and a temper adapted to the 




• Iterations to find the right 
business model 
Team • Recruitment of key profiles 
Legal aspects 
• Creation of the venture 
• Intellectual Property 
Finance 
• Investors: public or private, 
Venture Capitals 




The scaling phase is a hypergrowth phase: the revenues should dramatically increase 
in an addressable market of critical size (Cohan, 2019). Cohan depicts how this phase 
implies very difficult issues at every level of the startup: at the business level, the 
development strategy becomes crucial to gain new market shares ; the workforce must 
double or triple to address this growth in every way but recruiting simultaneously 
several talents and building up a real team at the same time is a very challenging task. 
Finally, hypergrowth implies a need for more funds which are usually found with a 
Series A investment, whose contract clauses are decisive for the startup’s future (The 








• Industrialization, adaptation of 
the business model to a large 
market 
Team • Drastic increase of the work force 
Legal aspects 
• Respecting market regulations. 
Consulting a lawyer can be 
useful. 
Finance 
• Series A 
• Loans 
• Public funds 
 
Expansion 
The expansion is the last phase of the startup’s life. At the end of this phase, the offer 
will address several markets or segments, at an international level. From the business 
point of view, new strategic markets must be wisely selected, and the product or 
service must be accordingly adapted (The Boston Consulting Group, 2018). This 
expansion also implies the optimization of the production and distribution, the 
automatization of processes, and a good human resources management.   
EXPANSION 
Business • Internationalization 
Team 
• Creation of an HR department to 
manage the workforce 
Legal aspects 
• Adaptation to new market 
regulations 
Finance 
• Series B 
• Loans 





This generic track can be applied to a large spectrum of startups. Nevertheless, some 
startups face specific challenges and express particular needs, due to the technology 
they develop or to the market they address. For instance, it is the case for deeptech 
startups (Bpifrance, 2019). The next section will focus on the specific needs of 
GreenTech startups, which were uncovered by prior studies. 
 
2.2 Definition of GreenTech 
 
Across countries and industries, a large spectrum of definitions for the term 
“GreenTech” exists. Because this word is broad and encompasses various 
technologies, the definitions do not describe the technology, but explain the outcomes 
of a “green technology”.  
The US National Science and Technology Council defines GreenTech as “a 
technology that advances sustainable development by 1) reducing risk, 2) enhancing 
cost effectiveness, 3) improving process efficiency, and 4) creating products and 
processes that are environmentally beneficial or benign” (Hoff, 2012). The definition 
given by the 2 co-authors of The Clean Tech Revolution is even more detailed and 
precise : “Clean technology comprises a diverse range of products and services, from 
solar power systems to hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs), that 1) Harness renewable 
materials and energy sources or reduce the use of natural resources by using them more 
efficiently and productively, 2) Cut or eliminate pollution and toxic wastes, 3) Deliver 
equal or superior performance compared with conventional offerings, 4) Provide 
investors, companies, and customers with the promise of increased returns, reduced 
costs, and lower prices, 5) Create quality jobs in management, production, and 
deployment” (Pernick & Wilder, 2007). The consulting group PwC more simply 
defines GreenTech as “technologies that are explicitly focused on reducing GHG 
emissions or addressing the impacts of global warming” (Herweijer & Azhar, 2020). 
In this study, « GreenTech » refers to technologies and industrial services which 
optimize the consumption of natural resources, water, energy and raw materials. 




GreenTech startups apply technologies and industrial services which optimize the 
consumption of natural resources, water, energy and raw materials; while generating 
economic value and offering the same or better performances than existing 
technologies. 
As previously explained, GreenTech covers several technologies which are usually 
classified into five to seven sectors. These sectors reveal the key challenge areas which 
contribute the most to climate change and have the worst environmental impact. The 
categorization chosen by Bpifrance to study GreenTech startups consists in 6 sectors 

































Mobility & Transport 
Electric 
Hydrogen 
Agriculture & Agrifood 
Processes & Production 
Decision Support Tool 
Robotics 
Biocontrol 
Food for health 
Animals, farming, aquaponics 
Environment 
Air: pollution, treatment, quality 
Water: pollution, treatment, quality 
Soils 




Green chemistry & Materials 
Green chemistry 














2.3  Specific needs of GreenTech startups 
 
As explained in the previous part, GreenTech refers to technologies which optimize 
the environmental transition. As the name GreenTech suggests, GT startups 
differentiate themselves from generic startups for two reasons:  
- They rely on (new) technologies, 
- They have a positive impact on the environment. 
2.3.1 Deeptech startups needs 
Because GT startups rely on new technologies, a non-negligible number of them can 
be categorized as deeptech startups (Bordeau, 2021). The adjective deeptech refers to 
technologies that can be defined as “disruptive solutions built around unique, protected 
or hard-to-reproduce technological or scientific advances” (de la Tour, Soussan, Harlé, 
& Chevalier, 2017). According, to a study conducted by the Boston Consulting Group 
in partnership with Hello Tomorrow, because deeptech startups rely on brand new 
technologies, they have to face their own challenges and therefore, have specific needs 
(2017). 
To understand the needs of deeptech startups, it is crucial to have a complete idea of 
their specificities. Deeptech startups develop groundbreaking technologies and are 
characterized by four criteria (Boujo, 2019): 
1) They have a link with the research ecosystem: they usually originate from 
public or private research laboratories or rely on a team with strong links to the 
scientific ecosystem (founders have a highly technical/scientific profile). 
2) They must raise technological barriers: an innovative and complex technology 
makes it more difficult for competitors to reproduce the product or service, 
which is usually protected with patents.  
3) The technologies offer a strong competitive advantage: it can be related to an 
innovative process which enables the startup to offer its products or services at 
a very competitive price. More simply, the advantage might be due to the 
development of a brand-new product with innovative features giving rise to the 




4) They have a long and complex go-to-market: the development, 
industrialization and commercialization take time, which implies a very 
capitalistic process until commercialization. 
The most widespread tool adopted to follow the progression of a new technology is 
the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) scale, created by NASA in 1989 to manage 
the technological risks of its programs (Boujo, 2019). This scale, which is reproduced 
in Figure 3, determines the maturity level of a technology, from the emergence of the 
idea in a laboratory to the industrialization stage (Straub, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 3: TRL scale 
 
Bearing this scale in mind, it is easy to understand that deep tech startups face a specific 
challenge compared to other startups: bringing a new technology to the market. 
Consequently, at each stage of the startup development previously described (Ideation, 
Creation, Seed, Scaling, Expansion), they need precise support to overcome this 
challenge. In other words, they need technological expertise (de la Tour, Soussan, 




introduced in the startup development steps as follow: TRL 1,2,3 are prior to Ideation, 
TRL 4,5,6 happen between Ideation and Creation, TRL 7,8,9 are overcome between 
Creation and Seed (Bpifrance, 2019).  
Alongside the technological needs deeptech startups have during the whole 
development process, they have other specific needs related to their highly 
technological character (de la Tour, Soussan, Harlé, & Chevalier, 2017). Bringing a 
new technology to the market also requires some adjustment along the startup 
development process in each grand category of needs that were identified (Business, 
Team, Legal aspects and Finance). 
Business 
When it comes to business, the challenge faced by a deeptech startup is twofold. First, 
the technology developed might not be launched on the marker straight away, either 
because the market is not mature enough, or because no application exists for this new 
technology (de la Tour, Soussan, Harlé, & Chevalier, 2017). In that case, the 
“technology push” strategy needs to be applied (Nam & Tatum, 1992). Then, an 
extensive and continuous technological watch is required in order to remain ahead 
of other competitors (Bpifrance, 2019). 
Team 
In a deeptech startup team, the first founder is usually a researcher, or a person related 
to a highly technological or scientific network. Therefore, the need to find a 
cofounder is even higher than in other startups because this initial founder usually 
lacks business expertise (Bpifrance, 2019).  
Legal aspects 
For a deeptech startup, the legal aspects are much more important, especially the 
Intellectual Property questions. It is crucial to protect the innovation with licenses 
or patents in order to preserve the competitive advantage (Mines Paristech, 2012), and 







The development process of a deeptech startup is long, complex and therefore highly 
capitalistic: “60% of deeptech startups [identify] funding as their most critical 
resource and 80% ranked it in their top 3”. (de la Tour, Soussan, Harlé, & Chevalier, 
2017). The high costs are indeed not only due to the long period of time before reaching 
rentability, they are also explained by the very expensive infrastructures needed: unlike 
startups developing a simple platform, deeptech startups need costly equipment, 
hardware, machines, to test and prototype their product/service. 
Like other startups, it is important to identify the right financial resources at the right 
time, but deeptech startups have higher expectations in terms of:  
- Subventions: at early stages, deeptech startups rely a lot on subventions 
because the time to market is still too long for investors to find an interest.  In 
France, a lot of money (around 10Mds€ each year) is dedicated to innovation 
(Bpifrance, 2019): Research Tax Credit, subventions allocated by Bpifrance, 
etc. Additionally, subventions are sometimes an opportunity for deeptech 
startups to gain visibility, with innovative competitions awarding the best 
innovations for instance. These competitions are also a way to prepare the 
market and customers to the disruptive innovations (Bpifrance, 2019). 
- Finding the right investors. It is important to find the investors whose 
investment strategy is suitable with the deeptech sector: with momentous 
challenges in terms of regulations and industrialization, very high investments 
are required to obtain Return on Investment (ROI), and with a long-term 
approach. 
 
2.3.2 Challenges and needs of startups addressing environmental problems 
According to some studies, GT startups have their own challenges and issues, that 







The first challenge identified in all the articles which evaluate GT startups needs is 
related to the difficulty of finding enough money, at the right time. According to 
Herweijer & Azhar, “finance is the key and ongoing challenge” for climate-tech 
startups (2020). 
The reason for this difficulty to find investors, is found in the development process of 
enviro-tech startups. Such startups are highly capitalistic, much more than other 
industries, and when ten million euros can be more than enough for a lot of startups, 
most GT startups need up to 10 or 20 times more money to succeed (Baltes & Büchele, 
2015). Green technologies require indeed a lot of money and a lot of time to be 
developed, from the early stages of research and development (Herweijer & Azhar, 
2020), until the industrial and scale-up phase (Silverberg, 2015).  
Therefore, the usual investment actors (Venture Capitals and investment funds) are not 
adapted to climate tech startups and “the right kind of capital is missing” to address 
their needs. (Ott, Wadsack, Ihly, & Cozart, 2021). Indeed, because R&D takes time, 
return investment takes time as well : GT startups will not scale up rapidly and thus, 
the time before exit will be extremely long for investors who do not have the patience 
to wait (Baltes & Büchele, 2015). Venture Capitals (VCs) expect high return on 
investment (Ott, Wadsack, Ihly, & Cozart, 2021) so they prefer to invest in software 
or IT startups which will have a higher and quicker return on investment than GT 
startups: they present lower risks because they need a little amount of money to scale 
up in a very short time (Hao, 2018). Moreover, because enviro tech startups need a lot 
of money, those “return oriented players” know that such startups will need more 
money later, and not only the first time they contact VCs (Baltes & Büchele, 2015). 
For one euro invested, they know they will have to invest two or three euros later, and 
they usually cannot afford it. 
At the beginning of the 21st century, because of the suddenly keen interest from the 
media and VCs for climate tech startups, some investors invested huge amounts of 
money in GT startups and tried to make them scale up rapidly. Consequently, a lot of 
startups died between 2005 and 2010, even those who were supported by public 




instance, the Californian startup Solyndra developed a solar energy solution in the 
early 2000s and raised 700 million dollars. However, the startup did not pass the 
industrial phase, because the founders and investors did not take the time to evaluate 
the industrial and financial viability of the model and did not have the time to pivot 
before it was too late. So, the startup filed for bankruptcy in 2013 (Silverberg, 2015). 
Silverberg explains that Better Place, a startup who developed a network of “battery 
swapping stations for electric vehicles” and raised 850 million dollars experienced the 
same end, as well as other GT startups at the same time (2015). 
Baltes & Büchele evaluated the investment ecosystem in Baden Württemberg in 
Germany and identified two other factors which are restraining investors from dealing 
with GT startups (2015). First, beyond their long and capitalistic development, climate 
tech startups are also risky for investors because they rarely have an entire confidence 
in the founders of the startups who are sometimes too much “research oriented” and 
not enough “business oriented”. An investment in those startups will be risky for them 
because they do not have the same point of view, which is not suitable. The second 
factor the researcher identified, is the inconsistency of regulations: they might change 
during the long R&D process of the startup which would not be able to address the 
market anymore.  
For all these reasons – a long and capitalistic development, fast changing regulations, 
atypical founders’ profiles; only a few actors invest in GT startups and the “investment 
climate tech ecosystem is nascent” (Herweijer & Azhar, 2020). In Israel, the capital 
invested in GreenTech startups only represented 5% of the total investment capital 
(Hao, 2018). In Germany, only 2.4% of early-stage investments were dedicated to the 
cleantech sector in 2015 whereas GT startups represented 13.6% of all startups in the 
country, thus the “early stage venture capital market for GreenTech companies is yet 
underdeveloped” (Baltes & Büchele, 2015). Moreover, investors invest mostly once 
or twice in GreenTech startup: so, most of them do not develop the expertise that is 
expected from them and that would be obtained by investing regularly in GT startups 
(Herweijer & Azhar, 2020). 
Business Angels could be the right investors for GT startups, because they usually 




to help the startup  (Baltes & Büchele, 2015). When acting alone, they do not bring 
much money, but if they add up together, they can invest larger amounts of money 
than VCs. The problem is that it is very difficult for a startup to identify Business 
Angels who remain silent and incognito. Finding the ones who will match the startup 
is a “time consuming” and “costly” effort, which is not always rewarded (Baltes & 
Büchele, 2015).  
Of course, other sources of funding exist, and startups can find financial support with 
public grants and subventions (Ott, Wadsack, Ihly, & Cozart, 2021). Some EU-SME 
programs exist to finance specific needs of GT startups, but the money brought by 
public funds will not be enough for most of them (Baltes & Büchele, 2015).  
The need to develop a green technology expertise 
Like deeptech startups, because of their technologic character, GT startups have a 
higher need for infrastructures and expensive equipment than any other startups, and 
an intensive coaching of the GT founders is often required because they usually have 
excellent scientific competencies but no entrepreneurial experience (Ott, Wadsack, 
Ihly, & Cozart, 2021). But GT startups face two other challenges that deeptech startups 
might not always confront.  
The first one is related to regulations. Because climate change, pollution and 
biodiversity are becoming increasingly important in the governments’ policies, 
regulations in this sector also evolve continuously (Herweijer & Azhar, 2020). 
However, a study from Pwc revealed that all these regulations are rarely adapted for 
the rapid growth of GreenTech startups (2020). Sometimes, the regulations do not 
evolve quickly enough, which prevent startups from selling their product/service 
despite all the benefits they could bring in the environmental transition. Old 
regulations can indeed be prohibitive: they are not adapted to the reality anymore and 
not adapted for new emerging technologies. The study also explained that regulations 
vary a lot between countries, and the absence of homogeneous regulations between 
countries makes it even harder for startups to scale up and expand internationally. In 
the United States, regulations even differ from one state to the other. If all deeptech 
startups have to overcome strict regulations which are not adapted to new technologies, 




necessarily have the expertise to understand which technologies could be benefic for 
the environment (Herweijer & Azhar, 2020). 
The other one is linked to the technology developed by GT startups. These new 
technologies developed are usually extremely complex to industrialize. Cleantech 
startups face challenges scaling up because they face problems that could not be 
identified earlier since the technology is still new and quite unknown (Hao, 2018). 
This “lack of technology knowledge in the cleantech sector” and the uncertainty of the 
new technologies force startup founders to be patient, scale up step by step and not to 
quickly in order to be able to adapt and change if their solution turns out to be 
economically or technologically non-viable (Silverberg, 2015). Here, it is crucial to 
underline the fact that, if some studies identify this challenge as a specificity of 
GreenTech startups, it seems that deeptech startups – that is, startups developing new 
technologies which are not necessarily dedicated to the environmental transition; 
actually, all have to tackle this issue (Boujo, 2019). 
The need for a strong and supportive ecosystem 
Global warming, climate change, are affecting everybody. But the efforts required 
from individuals and industries to make things change, to initiate an energetic 
transition can be extremely demanding and intense. The environmental transition 
involves sacrifices from people and companies, who are usually not eager and/or not 
ready to make. Therefore, governmental and educational institutions have an immense 
role of influence to play (Hoff, 2012). Incentives from governments must force 
companies to initiate their energetic transition, and support from governments and 
educational institutions must help GreenTech startups and other green initiatives from 
all companies access the market to offer new, and more durable solutions (Herweijer 
& Azhar, 2020). 
The role of the government is key to promote green technologies and to create a 
sustainable GreenTech ecosystem (Hao, 2018). And a strong and supportive 
ecosystem is crucial to allow GT startups to grow and flourish, especially because the 
knowledge in green technologies is still under construction while the emergency to 
take action and act for climate is growing stronger (Hoff, 2012). An Italian study 




knowledge in the GreenTech sector are needed in a given geographical area in order 
to see climate tech startups appear in this particular area (Giduici, Guerini, & Rossi-
Lamastra, 2019). Büchele & Baltes also explained the importance to build GreenTech 
clusters to foster the creation of GT startups, like the LA Cleantech Incubator in 
California which provides funding, working space, scientific expertise, equipment, and 
business support in the same place (2015). And this ecosystem should start from the 
universities, which have a crucial role to play: GreenTech programs in schools and 
universities should encourage entrepreneurship and offer to students the possibility to 
receive the adequate formation in order to be able bring to the market their innovative 
ideas (Baltes & Büchele, 2015). 
The characteristics, and the ways to create the most effective entrepreneurial 










3. Entrepreneurial GreenTech Ecosystem 
 
3.1  Entrepreneurial Ecosystems 
 
3.1.1 Entrepreneurial Ecosystem concept 
The concept of EE appeared in the 1980s and 1990s when scholars abandoned their 
research on the relation between the personality of an entrepreneur (Schumpeter, 1934) 
and the success of a new venture, to work on the networks and structures supporting 
entrepreneurship (Dodd & Anderson, 2007). The popularity of EE increased with the 
work of Daniel Isenberg (Isenberg, 2010) in the Harvard Business Review, who 
insisted on the crucial role of a strong ecosystem made of diverse actors to support the 
creation and growth of successful startups (Harrison & Spigel, 2017). 
Spigel defines an ecosystem as “the union of localized outlooks, social networks, 
investment capital, universities and active economics policies that create environments 
supportive of innovation-based ventures” (Spigel, 2017). According to him, it is 
impossible to transform entrepreneurial innovation into a solid economy without an 
ecosystem. 
EE recently became an interesting tool to understand how to encourage and foster the 
creation of new ventures (Harrison & Spigel, 2017). However, “Research on 
ecosystems is underdeveloped and under-theorized” (Spigel, 2017), which makes it 
difficult for governments and policy makers to make the right choices in a given 
ecosystem (Harrison & Spigel, 2017). Usually, research on EE gives very precise 
recommendations in terms of culture, economy, policy, but do not explain how these 
elements are all interrelated (Motoyama & Watkins, 2014). Consequently, a lot of 
governments merely import successful models they acknowledge in other countries 
without considering the economic and cultural background which are also responsible 






3.1.2 Features of an Entrepreneurial Ecosystem 
Spigel identifies 10 attributes of EE, which support the creation and success of new 
ventures, although the presence of all these 10 elements is not necessary to build a 
successful EE (Spigel, 2017). 
- 2 cultural attributes:  
o “Cultural attitudes” which define who and how an entrepreneur should 
be,  
o Histories of successful entrepreneurs and new ventures, which must be 
used to inspire new entrepreneurs and students. 
- 4 social attributes:  
o A very dense network to support entrepreneurship with market and 
technical knowledge, but also investors, customers and suppliers. 
Connections to other networks is also crucial to gain new knowledge 
regularly.  
o Investors whose money but also experience will help support new 
ventures.  
o “Mentors and dealmakers” who are essential to foster the growth of 
startups by establishing relations between actors and advising 
entrepreneurs.  
o Skilled workers with technical and/or managerial knowledge who do 
not fear the uncertainty of entrepreneurship and are able to adapt 
rapidly. 
- 4 material attributes:  
o Universities who can provide knowledge to new ventures through 
research license or other collaborations, and who must educate students 
to entrepreneurship (Wolfe, 2005).  
o Support services such as human resources experts, patent advisors, 
lawyer; and support firms like incubators, accelerators have an essential 
role in this ecosystem, although their effectiveness is not always 




o Policies and governance who can facilitate the creation of new ventures 
through the creation of publicly funded programs (incubation, support 
services, etc.) or by reducing bureaucracy for entrepreneurs (Huggins 
& Williams, 2011). 
o The presence of “strong local markets” with customers having specific 
needs to which the new startups can answer. Entrepreneurs are indeed 
in more direct contact with the customers and thus, understand their 
needs better. 
The relationships between all these attributes is as much important as the attributes 
themselves (Spigel, 2017). For instance, without the cooperation of existing programs, 
policies cannot push the creation of new ventures, and programs cannot be efficient 
without the appropriate cultural attitudes. 
Stam also adds that entrepreneurs are a crucial part of this ecosystem as well (Stam, 
2015). According to him, their existence is not solely a result or a consequence of an 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. Entrepreneurs have a key role in Ees because they 
challenge them and keep them “healthy”.  
 
3.2  Actors of the GreenTech ecosystem in France 
 
In France, five to six actors can be identified as the main actors of the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem: SATTs, TTOs, Carnot Institutes, Incubators, Competitive poles and 
Technopoles (Agence Nest, 2020). Thus, they are also essential actors for the 
GreenTech ecosystem.  
ITEs (Institutes for the Energetic Transition) were created by the French government 
in 2010: they are interdisciplinary centers specialized in renewable energies. Their role 
is to bring together research and industrial competencies to strengthen the ecosystem 
of Competitive poles in the energy sector (Gouvernement Français, 2021).  





Carnot Institute Public research structure, regrouping 
various laboratories and scientific 
platforms 
SATT Private organism which helps to transfer 
technologies from various laboratories 
to the market 
TTO Public organism which helps to transfer 
technologies from its laboratories to the 
market 
ITE Regroups companies and laboratories, 
working on the energetic transition 
Incubator Supports startups business growth 
Competitive Pole and Technopole Regroups companies and laboratories, 
working on the same topic 
Table 2: Main actors of the GreenTech ecosystem in France 
 
It can be interesting to observe the geographical repartition of incubators and 
competitive poles which have a GreenTech specialization (among the six sectors 
detailed in the chapter 2 of this study: Mobility, Environment, Energy, Agriculture & 
Agrifood, Green Chemistry and Durable materials, Durable construction). 
There are forty-three incubators with a GreenTech specialization in France, and more 
than a half is located in the area of Paris, the capital of the country (Dulin, 2021). Four 
other regions have a quite significant number of incubators, but all others only have 
one or two Greentech incubator. This repartition, depicted in the next Figure, reveals 






Figure 4: Geographical repartition of GreenTech Incubators in France 
 
On the contrary, competitive poles and technopoles which could be labeled as 
GreenTech are only found in regions of France, but not in the capital, as illustrated in 
Figure 5. 
 






3.2.1 Emergence of GreenTech startups 
Since the early 2000s, the popularity of the GreenTech sector in France has known 
distinct highs and lows, like everywhere else in the world (Laurent, 2017). After a keen 
interest from Venture Capital (VC) firms from 2006, funding in the sector as well as 
the creation of cleantech startups dropped until 2015 (Gaddy, Sivaram, & O'Sullivan, 
2016), when the Paris Agreement gave a new momentum to the sector (United Nations 
Climate Change, 2016). 
The year 2015 was indeed a positive turning point for the greentech sector: the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) committed to loan 20 billion euros per year until 
2020, in order to finance projects acting against climate change (Laurent, 2017) and 
the Paris Agreement gave incentives for technology transfer. In France, commitments 
to fight against climate change grew stronger as well. In August 2015, the government 
published a new law which gave precise objectives and means to reduce waste, energy 
consumption and greenhouse gases emissions (République Française, 2015). In 
February 2016, the French Ministry of ecology launched the “GreenTech Verte” 
initiative which was later renamed “GreenTech Innovation”, and started building an 
ecosystem to support GreenTech startups, with partnerships from incubators and 
laboratories (Ministère de la transition écologique et solidaire, 2017). Along with this 
initiative, an official GreenTech label was created. This label identifies the most 
promising startup projects in terms of innovation and environmental impact, and gives 
access to a large panel of services including incubation, formation, networking, etc. 
Today, 172 startups possess the GreenTech label (Ministère de la transition écologique 
et solidaire, 2021). 
3.2.2 Today 
According to a study recently conducted by Bpifrance, today in France, 7% of startups 
can be classified as GreenTech and belong to one of the GreenTech sector described 
in Table 1 (Bordeau, 2021). Moreover, the same study shows that whereas the energy 
sector represented 43% of the GreenTech startups in 2011, this number dropped to 
30% in 2020, revealing a growing diversity of GreenTech startups and their sectors of 
application, which is depicted in Figure 6. However, the environment and energy 





Figure 6: GreenTech startups in France and their sectors 
 
If the capital region appears to host the greatest number of GreenTech startups, only 
22% of the GreenTech startups are located in Paris (Bordeau, 2021). Figure 7 shows 
the repartition of GreenTech startups in the regions of France and gives some examples 
of GreenTech startups. Additionaly, Bordeau underlines that all the regions in France 
are very dynamic when it comes to the GreenTech sector, and states that no region 
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Figure 7: Geographical repartition of GreenTech startups in France 
 
Finally, in 2021, GreenTech startups represent 12% of the French Tech 120 program 
(Bordeau, 2021). The French Tech 120 selects the most promising French startups 
which already reached a relatively high maturity stage. They are selected based on 
several financial criteria such as their revenues or their fundraising, by Bpifrance and 
the government (La French Tech, 2021). By integrating this program, startups get 
support for one year, to access different services and gain more visibility. The higher 
proportion of GT startups belonging to the French Tech 120 compared to the 
proportion of GT startups in France, demonstrates a certain ambition from the French 
government, to increase its support to GT startups. 
The recent enthusiasm for GreenTech startups and the solutions they could bring to 
face climate change, led the French government and Bpifrance to support them more 
specifically. As previously explained, GreenTech startups develop technologies which 
optimize the consumption of natural resources while generating economic value. Like 
any other startups, they face challenges and must be supported by several actors 
throughout their development, from their creation to their expansion and/or 
internationalization, in order to have better chances to thrive. These actors are part of 
an entrepreneurial ecosystem, which is efficient if a sufficiently wide variety of actors 




the country are suitable to such ecosystems. Some studies tried to study specific needs 
of GreenTech startups. But the literature review highlighted how the “specific” needs 
identified by several studies are very close to deeptech startups needs. However, 
several actors of the French GreenTech entrepreneurial ecosystem can be labeled as 
“GreenTech” actors, but the wide variety of these actors does not mean that they cover 
efficiently GreenTech startups needs. Consequently, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of this 
study will aim at identifying more precisely specific GreenTech startups needs and 






4. Methodology  
 
4.1 Research Approach 
 
After only two months working with GreenTech startups, it became rapidly evident 
that the GT ecosystem was very opaque to them. On the one hand, they had no clear 
idea of which actors were existing in the ecosystem and which one to choose at each 
stage of startup development. It seemed that the plurality of actors, instead of helping 
them, was so confusing that they struggled to find the right actor which could be able 
to address their needs. Many startups start to work with one specific actor they find, 
and then discover other actors thanks to the first ones or by chance. Sometimes, they 
are lucky enough to find the right actor at the right time. But sometimes, they never 
find the most appropriate ones, or when they do it is too late, usually because they are 
too old and not eligible anymore. Moreover, some startups, who spend hours trying to 
find the right actor through personal research on the internet, then realize that the 
services offered were not the ones they expected. In other words, the services offered 
by each actor in the GreenTech ecosystem are far from being clear. On the other hand, 
it is also extremely difficult for GreenTech actors to properly address GT startups 
needs if they are not aware of these specific needs – if GT startups do have particular 
needs as opposed to “regular” startups. 
These two observations justify the choice of a “field survey” as a research method, 
which was conducted to understand 1) specific needs of GT startups; and 2) the exact 
services offered by GT actors. A qualitative research is indeed much more appropriate 
than a quantitative research in order to have a deep understanding of what is existing 
and what should exist to answer GT startups’ needs. This research study does not aim 
at measuring statistical hypotheses but was designed to explore the GT ecosystem in 
France. As a consequence, GT startups and GT actors were interviewed. 
A large panel of different types of investigation exists to conduct qualitative 
interviews. According to Choi, in his book The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data 




- Extremely structured interviews, where questions are asked in a very specific 
order. In that case, the interviewee has no chance to deeply expose its views 
and opinions. However, the answer to each question is easily obtained. 
- Semi-structured interviews. In that case, the topic and the questions are 
prepared by the interviewer and the interviewee guides partly the discussion. 
The interviewer draws on the answers given and redirect the questions and 
conversation when necessary. 
- Unstructured interviews which look like an everyday conversation, led by the 
interviewee. The interviewer only choses the topic and the interviewee guide 
the discussion. 
As Flick (1998) explains, it can be extremely hard to interview people who have an 
expertise in a specific field. Short and precise questions lead to a restrictive 
conversation with very few possibilities to obtain new insights. On the contrary, giving 
to interviewees the possibility to express more largely their point of views, can be 
useful to get more detailed information (Flick, 1998). 
The semi-directive approach was thus used in order to get exclusive insights while 
obtaining the information needed to answer the research questions of this study. In 
order not to lose the control of the interviews, an interview guide was prepared, 
following the CIMO logic. This research design enables to obtain results which are 
then relevant for practice, by describing “what to do [Intervention], in which situation 
[Context], to produce what effects [Outcome] and offer some understanding of why 
this happens [Mechanisms]” (Denyer, Transfield, & Van Aken, 2008, p. 396). 
Lastly, the inductive research strategy was chosen to conduct this study, as opposed to 
a deductive research method, which are built on existing theories. The deductive 
approach could have been used, in order to verify the several specific needs of GT 
startups that were found, but the literature was not explicit or clear enough to have a 
precise idea of these specific needs. On the contrary, the inductive methodology allows 
to explore relatively new topics (Eisenhardt, 1989) and to examine new findings by 




4.2  Data Collection 
 
4.2.1 Data collection of literature 
The present study was commissioned by Bpifrance, wishing to better understand the 
French GT ecosystem, its strengths and its weaknesses, and to identify some levers she 
could work on, in order to improve the support to GT startups which might have, 
according to her, some specific needs.  
To conduct this study, it was thus essential to first have a clear understanding of the 
development process of any “normal” startup and of their needs, but also to examine 
existing literature about potential specific GT startups needs. Since GT startups needs 
have not received much attention from prior academic literature, it became clear that 
this study should aim at identifying the existence or the absence of specific needs for 
GT startups. Second, to detect margins of improvement for the French GT ecosystem 
it was also crucial to appreciate the characteristics of an entrepreneurial ecosystem and 
to discern the various French GT actors as well as their theoretical roles. The literature 
review, from Chapter 2 to Chapter 4 of this study, serves these two prerequisites. 
The literature review could be conducted thanks to the aggregation of various sources: 
academic papers were found through multiple databases such as Google Scholar and 
JSTOR and thanks to the recommendations from advisors and supervisors of this 
thesis. More general information about GT actors state of the art of the GT ecosystem 
in France were obtained on specific websites, including official government website 
and landing pages of GT actors. Academic papers and other documents were collected 
thanks to keywords related to this study and were analyzed if the title and abstract 
matched the subject of this thesis. This search for literature was conducted until a point 
when newly found article did not bring new information anymore. 
4.2.2 Primary data collection 
In this thesis, primary data was mainly collected through the interviews of 2 broad 
categories of interviewees: GT startups and GT actors. As explained previously, this 
data collection was operated through semi-structured interviews, based on an interview 




the interviews were conducted online, via Microsoft Teams, because of the sanitary 
situation in France and the restrictions imposed by the government. The average 
duration of each interview was of 30 minutes. The interviewees were not recorded 
during the discussions, to ensure confidence and freedom of expression. Thus, primary 
data analysis relied on the notes taken during the interview, and not on transcripts. 
Following Eisenhardt recommendations (Eisenhardt, 1989), the primary data was 
completed by startups and actors’ presentations, and other kinds of reports which 
provided useful resources. 
Interviews of GT startups 
A team of experts at Bpifrance was working on the identification and definition of GT 
startups specific needs. In order to avoid executing the same work twice, and to avoid 
soliciting the same startups several times, the notes of the interviews which were 
already conducted, were used to collect the information needed for this study. As 
Bpifrance finances and supports a consequent number of startups, it was easy to 
interview their CEOs. 
Name Role Topic Field(s) 
Startup 1 CEO Alternative proteins Agriculture & 
Agrifood 




Startup 3 CEO Alternative proteins Agriculture & 
Agrifood 
Startup 4 CEO Synthetized meat Agriculture & 
Agrifood 
Startup 5 CEO Synthetized meat Agriculture & 
Agrifood 
Startup 6 CEO Proteins from algae Agriculture & 
Agrifood 
Startup 7 CEO Hydrogen 
technology 
Energy 




Interviews of GT actors 
Prior to interviewing GT actors, two tasks had to be conducted. The first one consisted 
in identifying all the existing GT actors in whole France. To do so, for each of the 7 
types of actors in the entrepreneurial ecosystem identified in the literature review 
(OTT, SATT, Carnot Institutes, Incubators, Competitive Poles, Technopoles, ITE), the 
names of all the actors were collected thanks to research on the Internet. This task was 
facilitated by the fact that each type of actors has a dedicated website where the whole 
network can be found. Then, only actors who indicated that they provided services 
identified as GT services, were selected. More than 200 GT actors were identified. The 
second task is related to sampling. Usually, in qualitative research, purposeful 
sampling is applied to select the right candidates (Patton, 2002). Among the different 
existing strategies for purposeful sampling, criterion sampling (Palinkas, et al., 2015) 
was more specifically chosen. The following criteria were thus applied:  
1) Several types of actors should be represented 
2) Different types of GT fields or categories (identified in the literature review) 
should be represented 
3) The actor has several years of experience in working with startups 
Those criteria ensured the collection of rich and relevant information, from various 
actors and categories, and enabled to avoid having biased knowledge. Most 
representatives were identified by several experts working at Bpifrance, with 
substantial knowledge about the different types of actors, and with a consequent 
professional network. Some were also contacted thanks to previous professional 
experiences at Bpifrance. Therefore, all the interviewees were contacted through a 
mutual contact, which enabled a rapid agreement from them to take part in the study. 
In total, 12 actors could be interviewed, from 6 different types of actors and with 
various specialty fields. Besides, on interview was conducted with the head of the 
technological poles network, which was of great help to have an overview of such 
actors. The list of interviewees can be consulted in Table 4. All of them were 





Name Role Type of actor Field(s) 
Incubator 1 Head of 
Incubation 
Program 
Incubator Environment, Mobility, 
Durable construction 
Incubator 2 Head of 
Innovation and 
Development 
Incubator Environment, Energy 
TTO 1  Head of startup 
partnerships 
TTO Green chemistry & Bio 
sourced materials 




Carnot 1  Director  Carnot Institute Agriculture & Agrifood 
Carnot 2  Director  Carnot Institute Agriculture & Agrifood 
Carnot 3 Head of 
partnerships 
Carnot Institute Agriculture & Agrifood 
Competitive 
Pole 1 





Competitive Pole Environment 
Technological 
Pole 1  
Head of 
Marketing 










Table 4: List of Interviewees (GT actors) 
 
As shown in Table 3, all startups interviewed – except one, can be classified in the 




actors belong to various GreenTech categories, and only the “Carnots” interviewed 
were in the agriculture sector. Therefore, the findings and results of the study cannot 
be representative of all GreenTech startups nor of the whole GreenTech ecosystem in 
France. 
 
4.3 Data Analysis 
 
To analyze data, the Gioia methodology was used (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). 
The data analysis started when the first interviews were conducted as Langley 
recommends (Langley, 1999). The codes and categories, that are later used for data 
analysis, usually appear with the first interviews and it is thus essential to work on both 
interviews and data at the same time (Langley, 1999). To execute first order coding, 
all the seemingly interesting themes extracted from primary data were dutifully noted, 
as the Gioia methodology suggests (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). The number of 
first order categories was then reduced by identifying redundancies. 
After the first order analysis, the terms were further regrouped to obtain more abstract 
second order themes. This second order analysis was conducted by identifying new 
understandings and information compared to the existing literature, or confirmations 
of the results of prior studies (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). Second order themes 
were then aggregate together to obtain third order concepts.  
The data structure established from first order concepts, second order themes and 
aggregate dimensions can be consulted in Figure 8 and Figure 9, in order to understand 
how second and third order categories were deduced from raw data. This data structure 
also shows the precision of qualitative analysis (Pratt, 2008).  
Two types of actors were interviewed: startups and supporting actors in the French GT 
ecosystem. Thus, needs of GT startups and offerings of GT actors could be assessed, 
and possible lacks in the French GT ecosystem and/or discrepancies were identified. 
The interviews of these two broad categories of actors also gave a chance to have a 
complete understanding of this ecosystem while limiting biased interpretations, thanks 




Interviews of GT startups enabled to evaluate their position in the GT ecosystem and 
to understand their opinion about this ecosystem. The data collected among startups 
were organized according to these two guidelines, and the data structure related to 
these interviews can be consulted in Figure 8. 
First Order Concepts Second Order Themes Aggregate 
Dimensions 
- Being guided by actors 
- Finding partners and 
customers 
- Discussing with other startups 
Interacting with the 
whole ecosystem 
GT startups want to 
be part of a complete 
and clearer ecosystem 
- R&D is crucial for GT 
startups 
- Intellectual Property is a 
conflictual topic 
- GT startups need 
infrastructures along the 
whole development process 
- Infrastructures are difficult to 
find 
Getting the right 
support in the R&D 
phase 
- Regulations are obstacles to 
the development 
- Differences of regulations 
between countries 
- Suspicion from customers 
Overcoming 
regulations and 
prejudices GT startups face 
specific challenges 
- Need for a lot of money 
- Importance of non-dilutive 
money 
Finding the right 
funding at the right 
time 
Figure 8: Data structure (GreenTech startups) 
 
Discussing with GT actors, it was then possible to assess their understanding of the 
GT ecosystem and to identify the various services they can offer to GT startups. Data 








- Definition of GreenTech 
- GT startups are not so 
different from other startups 
- GT startups are considered as 




How GT actors 
perceive GT startups 
- GT actors do not evaluate 
their support to GT startups 
- Support to GT startups is a 
recent activity 
Importance of GT 
startups for GT actors 
- Regulations 
- Market acceptability 
- Funding 
GreenTech startups 
needs from actor’s 
perspective 
- Developing key partnerships 
- Business support programs 
Business support 
GT actors’ services 
- Establishing connections with 
laboratories 
- TTOs and Carnot Institutes 
offer a clear scientific support 
Scientific support 
- Establishing the right 
connections with investors 
Financial support 
- Opacity of the GT ecosystem 
- Every actor stands as a 
reference in the GT ecosystem 
- Each actor has its own 




The French GT 
ecosystem still under 
construction 
- Collaboration inside a 
category of actors 
- Few collaborations between 
GT actors 
- A collaboration between GT 








- The GreenTech Innovation 
Network has a limited role 
Figure 9: Data structure (GreenTech actors) 
 
Following indications of the Gioia methodology, the interviews were conducted in 
parallel with the redaction of literature review, so that hypotheses from prior studies 
would not influence nor skew data analysis (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013). 




5. Findings  
 
5.1 GT startups want to be part of a complete and 
clearer ecosystem 
 
5.1.1 Interacting with the whole ecosystem 
Founders of GT startups require help from various actors, in order to find their place 
in the ecosystem. First, they need to be guided by actors who have a clear vision of 
the global ecosystem and who will be able to provide them with the right tools, 
scientific and business expertise, and partners. 
We need a much more structured support than the one offered by the SATT. We need 
a program with different stages and phases to be stimulated. [Startup 7] 
We had access to equipment, funding, expertise and business formation at the same 
place and at the same time, it was really helpful. [Startup 4] 
You have to find the right partners, the right mentors and incubators and/or 
accelerators. [Startup 2] 
If you cannot benefit from French scientific ecosystem and expertise, it is a real 
problem. [Startup 4] 
These actors are especially useful to find industrial partners and customers, who are 
crucial for the right development of the startup. 
Our first Proof of Concept was done with potential customers that were identified by 
our incubator, who then put us in contact with them. [Startup 3] 
We need help to identify and work with potential industrial partners, who would like 
to develop products and whom we could help with our innovation. [Startup 5] 
It is crucial to find industrial partners, but also very difficult. We need help to identify 




Finally, all the GT startups interviewed also evoked the importance to be able to 
exchange with other startups, with peers who experience or have experienced the 
same issues, in order to learn from each other. 
We have some contacts with other startups, but it could be interesting to be in contact 
with other complementary and/or bigger companies, to learn even more. [Startup 1] 
We are in contact with other startups from the GT ecosystem. [Startup 6] 
It is useful and interesting to work with other startups of the same field (…) sometimes 
what is missing is having some inputs from entrepreneurs, who would share their 
experience and recommendations. [Startup 4] 
5.1.2 Getting the right support in the R&D phase 
All the CEOs interviewed talked about the substantial R&D work they had to conduct. 
Technological development constitutes a large part of GT startups development. 
The technological barrier is really high. It took years to develop the technology. 
[Startup 1] 
We are 3 co-founders, and the rest of the team is made of biologists. [Startup 4] 
We have 10 researchers; we were able to internalize our technology. [Startup 6] 
Nevertheless, the actors who support this R&D phase do not have the same 
expectations and requirements as startups, which makes it sometimes difficult to work 
with them. More precisely, Intellectual Property is a conflictual topic. 
At the beginning, we worked with public laboratories, but it was complicated because 
we did not want to give up on Intellectual Property (…) and public laboratories do not 
work at the same pace. [Startup 2] 
We wanted to work with a SATT. But terms and conditions of IP were not acceptable. 
So, in the end we did not work with INRAE. [Startup 4] 
We did not talk about Intellectual Property with the SATT yet, it seems to be a difficult 
subject and the SATT avoids it. [Startup 7] 
Moreover, GT startups all need to have access to equipment and laboratories, even 




We can have access to labs thanks to our PhD students. [Startup 6] 
We can have access to the equipment of a technological pole, and this is very 
interesting for us because such tools are very expensive. [Startup 4] 
We were supported by the incubator FoodShaker which gives access to some 
laboratories, which was enough to test our first products. [Startup 3] 
We have various partnerships: AgroParisTech, Air Liquide, to have access to some 
labs (…) We also work with some mutualized platforms, but they are very expensive. 
[Startup 1] 
Because we could not work with public labs, we had to pay some mutualized 
technological platforms to have access to the right equipment. But such platforms are 
very expensive, and it was more subcontracting than partnership. [Startup 2] 
However, GT startups sometimes struggle to find the right infrastructures or 
equipment or technological platforms to conduct their R&D work. When they cannot 
work with labs, they have to pay technological and specialized platforms. 
It’s hard to work with INRAE because there is no public research about this topic. 
[Vital Meat] 
We do not use the labs from INRAE because they are rapidly saturated, occupied, and 
because the equipment is insufficient: either in quality or quantity. [Startup 1] 
We lack some support, especially from INRAE: they cannot work on our topic 
apparently and we had to give up a project we started with them. [Startup 4] 
 
5.2 GreenTech startups face specific challenges 
 
5.2.1 Overcoming restrictive regulations and prejudices 
A significant and recurrent challenge described by the informants is the barrier to 
access the market. Written and non-written rules are responsible for this barrier.  
Some of these rules are regulations in the European Union or in France, which 




In the European Union, the list of algae that can be sold as food is very short (…) the 
European lobbying is huge (…) there are also a lot of problems about norms, and 
compositions. It is very complex. [Startup 6] 
The subventions are dedicated to specific technologies (…) regulations about 
hydrogen is very opaque in Europe and trade unions are focused on “green hydrogen” 
and its electrical application, or about electrolysis (…) There is a kind of lobbying. 
[Startup 7] 
Moreover, differences exist in terms of regulations, from one country to the other, 
or from one continent to the other. Consequently, startups leave France for another and 
less strict country. 
Regulations from one country to the other are very different, and they are not always 
understandable (…) Other countries are more open to this kind of technology (…) I 
know that the United States finance such projects. [Startup 7] 
If nothing changes, all the products will come from the United States. [Startup 5] 
In terms of regulations, I know that the European market will be the slower to change. 
So, our target markets will be the United States, Japan and Singapore, who already 
express their position. [Startup 4] 
We are in contact with other companies in other countries, because France is late 
regarding this market. [Startup 1] 
The other obstacle to overcome is the prejudice and suspicion from the consumers 
who are not always eager to try new products and must be educated, especially if the 
product or service is eminently disruptive for the consumers. 
Acceptability by the market is a real problem. There is a strong resistance from media 
and politics. It’s a shame because France is in a good position in the agricultural field. 
[Startup 1] 
Research in our sector [meat created in laboratories] is demonized (…) Acceptability 
by consumers will happen gradually. [Startup 5] 
The subject of meat produced in laboratories is very controversial (…) the problem is 
that only few people work on the topic in France, so, only few people can defend this 




We work a lot on the acceptability of our products by consumers. [Startup 6] 
Consumers are now more used to such products, so the barrier is not so high for us, 
although we work a lot on our communication. [Startup 3] 
5.2.2 Finding money at the right time and in the right way 
Because their development is long and highly capitalistic, GT startups need a lot of 
money. 
We need a lot of money, very rapidly, to be able to scale. [Startup 5] 
We need a huge amount of money to create our own labs and equipment, to apply for 
several patents, etc. [Startup 6] 
Usually, they try to beneficiate from subventions, and other non-dilutive money 
in the early phases of their development. 
We got several subventions from Bpifrance, and then we also got some loans, once 
we were more developed. [Startup 4] 
When you are a GT startup, you should try to finance your project with nondilutive 
money as much a possible, at least until the Proof-of-Concept. [Startup 2] 
We got 110k€ of subvention from Bpifrance when we started the project. [Startup 3] 
Only two of the CEOs interviewed talked about their difficulty to find enough money 
at the right time. 
We are in a maturation program with a subvention, but only a small amount of this 
subvention is dedicated to market research and business development, whereas we 
need to work on our strategy and business development if we want to choose the right 
and desirable applications for our technology. [Startup 7] 
We have a very good ecosystem in France when it comes to finding nondilutive 
money. But when you want to raise money, if you want to raise more than 100M€ it 






5.3 How GreenTech actors perceive GreenTech 
startups 
 
5.3.1 GreenTech startups definition 
Surprisingly, for the GT actors who were interviewed, the “GreenTech” definition 
was unclear, sometimes unknown. Some of them had never heard of that term, 
although they immediately understood the concept with the sole name. Thus, each one 
of them had their own definition of a GreenTech startup, which was usually linked 
with their own activity. 
A GreenTech startup has a positive impact on the environment with its new technology 
(…) There are many sectors, but GT startups offer services and products for ecologic 
transition, and new ways of consumption. [Incubator 2] 
I did not know the GreenTech concept before this interview (…) but I guess for us it 
comes to biotechnologies, agriculture and bio-sourced materials. [Carnot 1] 
It’s a startup which contributes to the energetic and ecologic transition (…) My 
competitive pole deals with the durable construction sector, so I only have GT startups. 
[Competitive Pole 1] 
A GT startup deals with environmental problems (…) In the UrbanLab we focus on 
durable construction, mobility and circular economy. [Incubator 1] 
GT is a very transversal technology: there are a lot of domains such as foodtech, 
agritech, smart cities. [Competitive Pole 2] 
We call it Eco innovation, and we define Eco innovation through the environmental 
and energetic transition challenges. [Technological Pole 2] 
GT startups create new technologies which take into account problems and needs 
related to climate change. [TTO 1] 
GT refers to technologies which are more respectful of the environment. It can be 
related to any technology, in our case it is biodiversity, new infrastructures for 




GreenTech is for every technology, service or product which reduces our impact on 
the environment [SATT] 
Consequently, informants struggled to identify specific needs of GT startups. Since 
most of them only helped and supported GT startups, they did not know how those 
startups were different from the others. Thus, for the great majority of GT actors, GT 
startups are just like any other startups. 
I think GT startups have the same needs as other startups, the ones I identify are not 
specific to cleantech or eco-tech startups. At least, this is how I feel. [Incubator 2] 
I do not know how other startups are, but I guess all the startups have the same need. 
[Carnot Qualiment] 
     GT startups are like other startups for us. [Incubator 1] 
5.3.2 Importance of GreenTech startups for GreenTech actors 
GT actors who were identified and interviewed all have their own ways of dealing with 
GT startups. GT incubators only work with GT startups, so 100% of their time and 
effort is dedicated to them. All the other actors also work with bigger companies, 
which cannot be considered as startups. The striking common point between these last 
actors is that they do not have a precise idea of the proportion of GT startups they 
are helping, among all the companies they deal with.  
The support to GT startups is a small part of the activity. We especially look for 
collaborative and partnerships contracts with companies. [Carnot 1] 
The proportion of startups is not identified, but it might be one third of all companies 
we help. [Carnot 3] 
I don’t have a clear vision of the number of startups we work with, I should evaluate 
this activity. [Carnot 2] 
We can welcome up to 35 companies and we have more and more startups. 
[Technological Pole 1] 
Our support to startup represents roughly one third of the activity maybe… but we are 




This common feature is sometimes explained by the fact that helping GT startups is 
a quite recent activity, or more exactly an activity that has been formalized only 
recently in in the structures that were initially not destined to startups in particular: 
Carnot institutes and competitive or technological poles. 
It’s been a long time since we have been helping the creation of new activities, but 
usually, it was an activity directly developed in companies. The startup model is quite 
recent for us (…) We were helping startups without knowing it. There was no specific 
ecosystem for thme before, so it was harder. [Carnot 1] 
Recently, a lot of young companies are looking for our help. [Competitive Pole 1] 
For two years, huge efforts at the national scale are made to improve the GreenTech 
support of SATT. [SATT] 
Another reason that was identified is that most Carnot Institutes and Competitive 
or Technological poles do not consider that startups are different from other 
companies, and thus, offer them the same services as companies, without distinction. 
For me, a startup is like any other company, so it can beneficiate from the support of 
the pole, however young or small it is. [Competitive Pole 1] 
We do not make any distinction. The definition of a startup is not a criterion for us. 
So, there is no specific offer or service for startups. [Competitive Pole 2] 
We are quite close to startups but there is no dedicated offer for them. [Carnot 3] 
5.3.3 GreenTech startups needs from actors’ perspective 
Nevertheless, in some cases, one or two needs were identified as specific to GT 
startups during the interviews. More specifically, three specificities emerged. The first 
one was related to regulations. It appeared that governmental regulations are 
sometimes an obstacle for GT startups which offer a new kind of product or use a 
technology in a new way, which is not considered in existing regulations or which is 
forbidden. 
Sometimes regulations are not adapted or are extremely restrictive. So, GT startups 




Regulations exist and must be taken into account, especially for GT startups. 
[Incubator 1] 
There are some regulation barriers, which prevent emergence and growth of these 
startups. [SATT] 
Another need identified by GT actors was the question of market acceptability. 
According to some of them, it is something all GT startups will have to deal with at 
some point, more than any other startups. 
They [GT startups] need more support and advice to work on the market acceptability 
of their product. [Carnot 3] 
GT startups offer alternative solutions. So, they have to demonstrate the performance 
of their product (…) Although the consumers’ demands are more and more oriented 
to this GT sector, it is sometimes hard to prove their relevance. [TTO 1] 
The third and last specific need that emerged from the discussions corresponded to 
funding. It seems that GT startups do not have the same needs in terms of finances. 
Most informants were quite vague about this notion, but one of them was more precise 
in the description of this particular need.  
Investors are not usual investors who pay big tickets. GT investors are funds with 
smaller tickets, and which exit earlier (…) Sometimes GT startups do not even raise 
funds, but instead rely on subventions, loans. (…) or investors come up at very early 
stages with micro-tickets. [TTO 2] 
Development costs are much higher than for other startups (…) The time-to-market is 
around 10-15 years for GT startups, so financial needs are around 100-200M€ 
minimum. [TTO 1] 







5.4 Services offered by GreenTech actors to 
GreenTech startups 
 
GreenTech actors try to answer GT startups’ needs and to help them overcome their 
challenges developed in the last section. They offer various services, related to their 
own area of expertise or their own mission in the GreenTech ecosystem. This section 
focuses on the second research question related to the services offered by existing 
GreenTech actors to GreenTech startups. 
5.4.1 Business support 
The informants interviewed help startups develop their business in two ways: by 
developing partnerships thanks to the network of the actors, and by helping them 
structuring their business model.  
All the GT actors that were interviewed claimed to be able to help develop the 
partnerships of GT startups. Carnot Institutes for instance, rely on a strong network 
of laboratories and experimental platforms.  
We can put founders or inventors in contact with researchers, laboratories, platforms 
(…) We also re-direct them to other Carnot Institutes or other structures such as 
INRAE Transfert. We have a good understanding of this ecosystem. [Carnot 1] 
We sometimes have a role of matchmaker with other structures such as competitive 
poles. [Carnot 2] 
France Futur Elevage is a network of research laboratories and agrotechnical institutes 
(…) We can put startups in contact with other infrastructures in our network, if they 
need specific infrastructures (…) Our objective is to increase partnerships. [Carnot 3] 
SATTs, which have the role to bring technologies from laboratories to the market, 
have partnerships with laboratories but also develop connections with industrial 
partners. Thus, it seems that they can help startups develop partnerships with 
companies which could be their future clients. They also support startups in finding 
the appropriate VCs to raise funds.  




Competitive poles and technological poles develop a network of companies: they 
work with companies and explained that they could put startups in contact with other 
companies if needed. Such poles are characterized by the fact that they have a very 
good knowledge of their specific ecosystem. 
We help startups to develop their network in three ways when they come to us. 1) 
They gain visibility and are presented to our clients and partners. 2) Our ecosystem is 
very favorable to establish partnerships, and we try to associate them with other SMEs. 
3) We help them answer to call for projects which allow them to meet potential 
partners. [Competitive Pole 1] 
We put startups in relation with other actors: it can be industrials, if they have a product 
or a service that could be useful for the startup, it can be bigger companies to develop 
partnerships or sometimes if the company wants to buy the startup. [Technological 
Pole 1] 
Startups which come to us want to expand their market. We offer them visibility, we 
help them to identify and be in contact with future key clients (…) They can establish 
technical contracts or outsourcing, subcontracting or co-contracting (…) We try to 
establish connections between startups and the ecosystem around us (…) We try to 
interact with territorial collectivities. [Competitive Pole 2] 
Incubators also help startups find their future clients by putting them in contact with 
companies.  
We have a good network of companies, and we can invite them to establish 
partnerships or make them meet the startups we help, because they can be potential 
clients for them. By answering call for projects, startups can also identify potential 
clients with our support. [Incubator 1] 
We have a wide diversity of partnerships: public, private… this is one of our great 
strength. We have big partners such as Orano, EDF, Sanofi. The founders of the 
incubator are big companies and public collectivities (…) We also organize workshops 
with companies [Incubator 2]. 
Among all the actors who were interviewed, only the two incubators offer a specific 




resources to help them structure their business model: formations, specific programs, 
business coaching, to only cite a few. 
We follow each and every startup very closely, with activities for all startups and by 
meeting each one of them individually (…) We have a wide variety of workshops 
about entrepreneurship and business acceleration (…) Our strength is our personalized 
programs. [Incubator 2] 
We developed a complete support to help startups develop their 
product/service/business, etc., from creation to scaling. Four people are dedicated to 
the business support for startups. It is a very transversal business support. [Incubator 
1] 
Nevertheless, the informant from the Technology Transfer Organism (TTO), 
explained that in such organisms, a business support exists. These programs are only 
dedicated to startups which emerge from the research organism (spin-offs) and for the 
earliest development phases of the startup: ideation, sometimes creation.  
We encourage the creation of startups from INRAE: we listen to them when they have 
a project and help them understand how they can transform their research project into 
a company (…) We have a pre-maturation program to obtain a Proof-of-Concept and 
confront them to the market, to the users. Inventors can also have access to 
entrepreneurial formations and pitch in front of investors. We also put them in 
relations with other actors to find their co-founder for instance, or investors to be 
challenged (…) We support these spinoffs until the creation of the startup. Once the 
startup is created, we only keep in touch with the startup to make sure the business 
license is correctly used, or for visibility purposes. [TTO 2] 
SATTs also help GreenTech startups to elaborate a first viable business model. 
We support startups until a viable business model is elaborated, usually until the first 
substantial fundraising. [SATT] 
5.4.2 Scientific support 
Just like business support, for scientific support, some actors can help startups by 
putting them in contact with other actors, and some actors can directly offer their 




Incubators can only establish relations between startups and laboratories or 
technological platforms because, unlike to business, technology is not their domain of 
expertise. 
One of our team “Research&Co” is working on partnerships with schools and 
universities so that startups we accelerate could use their laboratories (…) Incubators 
do not have dedicated laboratories for startups. [Incubator 1] 
If startups need it, we have some partnerships with fablabs. [Incubator 2] 
Competitive and technological poles do not all have the same resources. Poles 
generally have a very good expertise of their own field and they use this expertise 
to re-direct startups to specific actors, or to answer questions related to the 
application of the technology to the market. Some of them possess equipment, 
laboratories, and platforms that startups can use. 
We bring our knowledge about a specific GreenTech category, which is our domain 
of expertise. Because we are expert in this category, we know exactly which actor to 
contact for a specific need, which laboratory has the right equipment, etc. 
[Competitive Pole 1] 
We have a few machines (…) Each time a startup needs a specific equipment, we can 
contact another actor so that the startup can find the right laboratory or technical 
platform. [Technological Pole 1] 
Actors who are dedicated to the scientific and technological development are 
TTO and Carnot Institutes. Each institute has its own field of expertise and owns 
several laboratories and platforms that the startups can use. The startups can also ask 
for scientific advice and the Institutes can rely on their technological or scientific 
knowledge, owned by their researchers. It is with these actors that startups can find the 
adequate technological support they need. Usually, this support happens at the 
beginning of startup’s creation, sometimes before the creation, but rarely after 
the seed phase. 
Startups can have access to our labs, our platforms. We welcome the whole team in 
our laboratories so that they can use our equipment. We can also welcome their PhD 




creation (…) This help to startups can come at a very early stage: when the idea just 
emerged. Sometimes, we can also help after some money was raised. [Carnot 1] 
We have a network of experimental farms where startups can experiment their solution 
(…) Our researchers and infrastructures can help startups develop their idea (…) We 
help them right from the beginning of their project. Sometimes, startups come to us 
later, to develop a new service or a new feature to their existing product/service. 
[Carnot 3] 
We offer services such as platforms for prototyping or to test their products/services 
(…) We can also work together on research question if the company is eager to invest 
in a laboratory (…) There is also a possibility to transfer expertise and competencies 
via a PhD student for instance. [Carnot 2] 
We make the bridge between innovation in research and industrial development (…) 
We help startups to accelerate their technological development and achieve the Proof-
of-Concept stage (…) if their project matches with our platforms, equipment, 
expertise. These services are offered to startups from our laboratories or not, and 
which need our tools, technologies, platforms, in order to reach the pre-industrial 
phase. [TTO 1] 
SATT also help startups develop their technology, but after the technology is 
developed in the laboratories. They support the technology maturation.  
We help them to develop their technology, to make it mature. We work on their 
Minimum Viable Product, first real-life tests, etc. [SATT] 
5.4.3 Financial support 
The GT actors who were interviewed were not investors, but they all help startup to 
find some money, mainly thanks to partnerships, support in the search for various 
money sources (fund raising, subventions, etc.) and subventions from the 
government. 
Some of our partners are financial experts. [Competitive Pole 2] 
We help them to fill the files to obtain the subvention, financed by Bpifrance and Paris 




We have some money allocated to experimental projects with startups so that startup 
do not have to pay. They can thus consult our researchers and conduct several 
experimentations for free. [Carnot 1] 
Sometimes, but it is very rare, INRAE Transfert takes shares in the startups. [TTO 2] 
 
5.5  A French GreenTech ecosystem still under 
construction 
 
5.5.1 A GreenTech ecosystem unclear and incomplete 
For the actors who were interviewed, the French GT ecosystem is not structured yet: 
GT startups and actors lack visibility in this ecosystem, every actor identify itself as a 
reference for startups, and some essential startups’ needs are still not properly 
addressed by the ecosystem. 
First of all, according to GT actors, the French GT ecosystem is still utterly opaque, 
for startups as well as actors. The plurality of actors seems to be the reason for this 
opacity. Sometimes, the GT ecosystem is not even identified by actors who are part of 
it.  
The ecosystem is very varied and dispersed, which seems to be an obstacle to the 
development of GT startups. This ecosystem should be consolidated. [TTO 1] 
There is no specific GT event, or more exactly we did not identify any (…) I do not 
know if there is a GT ecosystem really. [Carnot 3] 
There is a wide variety of actors, offering different services for GreenTech startups. 
But all of these actors lack visibility. [Technological Pole 2] 
We try to decipher for startups, the ultra-complex innovative ecosystem. [TTO 2] 
This GT ecosystem is quite new and is still being developed. So, the offer is really 
broad. It should be more structured (…) A clarification is needed for startups to 




A lot of new incubators emerged to address the GT topic. But I do not know what the 
others do (…) More generally, in terms of GT actors, there are lots of them. [Incubator 
1] 
Second of all, because of this rather unorganized ecosystem, each informant who was 
interviewed regarded the structure to which he or she belonged, as a key actor in the 
GT ecosystem. All GT actors in regions (not in the capital) declared to be a 
reference in this ecosystem: either as a relay of information in a given geographical 
area and a specific field, or as the most strategic actor to collaborate with. 
Today, in the region, we have the role of a consultant in the field of durable 
construction: startups can get a lot of information by coming at us. Depending on their 
needs, we can re-direct them to the right actors or solutions (…) We are a relay of 
information. [Technological Pole 1] 
We are a valuable springboard for GreenTech startups. [Incubator 2] 
INRAE Transfert is a major and indispensable actor in the GreenTech sector. [TTO 2] 
We have a unique position: startups can have access to our industrial consortium, 
investors, researchers… we even create strategies at the financial and strategic levels. 
[TTO 1] 
Third, the French GT ecosystem is still under construction according to GT actors, 
because lacks in the support to GT startups could be identified. The main lacks 
identified were funding and technical infrastructures. 
There is a huge problem in France: startups cannot raise as much money as in the 
United States (…) we support startups who know they could raise a larger amount of 
money in the US. Then, they must choose between raising less money or delocalize in 
the US (…) There is also a huge need for pilot units allowing startups to scale-up: 
startups sometimes have to wait a very long time before accessing such infrastructures, 
and this is not normal [TTO 1] 
I think some fablabs, workshops, where startups could test their products or services, 





For two or three years, there are more and more VCs and investors focusing on startups 
with a positive impact on the environment. But only a few are mature enough. 
[Incubator 1] 
Raising funds is mainly possible in Paris, in the capital (…) it is too much centralized. 
[Competitive Pole 1] 
It is not easy to find the right financial support at the right time for GreenTech startups. 
[Technological Pole 2] 
Finally, GreenTech actors do not all have the same approach and do not have the 
same strategy to support GreenTech startups. Multiple informants have been 
witnessing an increasing the number of GreenTech startups in the past few years, and 
thus want to adapt their activity to support GT sups in the proper way. 
We will soon have an incubation program for startups in the durable construction 
sector (…) as well as a R&D platform for startups who need a laboratory for their 
experimentations (…) For two or three years, we have a growing demand from startups 
in the Greentech sector.  [Technological Pole 1] 
Nowadays, more and more startups are addressing this ecoinnovation market, 
sometimes without being aware of it. So, we have been working with ADEME for 5 
years to offer better services. [Technological Pole 2] 
We try to adapt our offer to the evolution of startups (…) We just launched a new 
program for startups with a positive impact on the environment and for other startups 
wishing to take into account this problematic in their strategy. [Incubator 1] 
A lot of GT startups could be created with all the ongoing research projects of our 
partners (…) We want to develop our support to GreenTech startup, and we have a 
strategy until 2025. For instance, we want to create an investment fund to finance 
projects earlier. [TTO 1] 
Other actors do not plan to change or adapt their offer and services, either because 
they did not notice any change or particular trend, or because they believe that a change 
in their strategy is not necessary, despite the GT trend observed.  
There are more and more GT startups because the ecosystem is more friendly with 
them for the past few years (…) We did not plan to adapt our support specifically to 




We only have GT projects, so there is no particular change for us (…) We do not have 
a prospective activity dedicated to GT startups or SMEs, we just meet them during 
some events. [Carnot 3]  
There is an increasing number of startups recently, but not necessarily GT startups 
(…) We do not make a particular focus on GT startups (…) for me, it is just marketing 
(…) We had a focus on space once, but it’s because we won a competition, and we 
were able to create a specific support for these companies. [Competitive Pole 2] 
5.5.2 A limited collaboration between GreenTech actors 
The lack of structuration of this ecosystem can be compensated by the collaboration 
between actors. Members of a given category of actors are more or less coordinated, 
and actors try to communicate across different categories. But this collaboration is 
sometimes superficial and far from being systematic. 
Each structure interviewed, belongs or wishes to belong to a grand category of actors. 
It allows them to be more easily identified, and it gives a certain structure to the 
ecosystem. Actors in a given category usually coordinate themselves to support 
startups. 
There is a French association for competitive poles, to which we belong. We also 
belong to a smaller group of 11 competitive poles called “smart energy alliance”. 
[Competitive Pole 1] 
We try to get the RETIS label, in order to improve our offer (…) We already rely a bit 
on the RETIS network to communicate with other actors. [Technological Pole 1] 
Toulouse White Biotechnology is a public structure which relies on several TTOs: 
CNRS, INRAE for instance (…) We have access to several platforms and labs, and 
we can work with various partners from these TTOs. [TTO 1] 
The Carnot network was created by Alain Dupré (…) and there are some synergies 
between Carnot Institutes sometimes. [Carnot 2] 
When GT startups come to us, we can put them in relation with our own researchers 
or with other Carnot Institutes, or (…) INRAE Transfert. [Carnot 1] 
We sometimes discuss with other incubators in the rest of France, and they sometimes 




GT actors also make some efforts to improve the collaboration between the 
different categories of actors. These collaborations are quite limited and mainly 
consists in re-directing startups to other actors if the first one is not able to answer 
some needs and/or questions.  
We work in synergy with competitive poles, we are adherent to several of them, 
because we identified them as essential for startups to enter the market. This synergy 
is now structured thanks to a consortium which helps keeping a close contact. So, we 
put startups in relation with competitive poles. [TTO 2] 
France Futur Elevage works a lot with competitive poles (…) they organize some 
events with several actors to which we participate in to get more visibility. [Carnot 
France Futur Elevage] 
Startups sometimes come to us because they were sent by competitive poles (…) We 
need competitive poles who have a good knowledge of the ecosystem (…) We come 
as a complement of competitive poles, to capitalize on the research efforts. [Carnot 2]  
Every technopole has some relation with Carnot Institutes: if a startup needs a 
technical support or some specific tools, technopoles will make the link with its Carnot 
Institute partner. [RETIS] 
We know when to re-direct startups to investors and incubators (…) We also put them 
in relation with labs if they need some equipment that we cannot provide. 
[Technological Pole 1] 
We try to re-direct our researchers to the appropriate incubators (…) On the contrary, 
sometimes universities send us startups which need a scientific support. [Carnot 1] 
Recently, we have a closer link to incubators. Some of them just became our partners 
(…) Incubators send us startups which need our help. [Competitive Pole 1] 
Moreover, collaborations between different categories of actors are not always 
considered as essential. 
We want to develop partnerships with Universities and labs (…) but we do not have 
much time to develop such partnerships. [Incubator 1] 
Startups know the ecosystem (…) they can find the right incubator themselves. 




The GreenTech Innovation network, developed by the government, was 
mentioned by 4 actors only. Three of them described it as a mean to develop their 
network and learn from each other. The last one explained how vague and unclear the 
role of this network was. 
We belong to the GreenTech Innovation network which enable discussions between 
actors, the share of good practices, and access to strategic contacts. [Incubator 2] 
We are a member of the GreenTech Innovation network and part of the jury to give 
the GreenTech label. We also conduct collective actions to help Greentech startups. 
[Competitive Pole 1] 
The GreenTech Innovation network is very reactive, and we regularly interact with 
the head of the network in order to interact with other actors and better understand 
how we can support GreenTech startups (…) The GreenTech Innovation network is 
now spread everywhere in France. [Technological Pole 1] 
We wanted to be part of this GreenTech Innovation network… but it is very unclear 





6. Discussion  
 
6.1 Mapping of the French GreenTech ecosystem 
Based on the literature review and on the findings of this study, it is possible to have 
a clear understanding of the current GreenTech ecosystem in France: its strengths and 
its weaknesses, roles of the actors in the ecosystem and their interactions. This 
photograph of the current French GreenTech ecosystem also enables to point out the 
improvements and efforts that various GreenTech actors have to make in order to 
improve their support to GreenTech ventures. The following section gives a mapping 
of the French GreenTech ecosystem in France throughout the entire development 
process of a startup and underlines existing lacks in this ecosystem. 
6.1.1 Structure of the GreenTech ecosystem in France 
The French GT ecosystem is still opaque today for two main reasons. The first one 
could be the vague definition of the term “GreenTech”. Although everyone more or 
less understands what it means, no clear definition is shared by GT actors. As a 
consequence, every actor imagined or constructed its own definition. While most of 
these definitions are certainly close to the reality, the term “GreenTech” is sometimes 
used as a marketing tool by actors who do not really address GreenTech startups needs. 
Or, on the contrary the term itself is viewed as a marketing term and is thus neglected 
by actors who would be particularly interesting in the ecosystem because of their 
expertise and the services they could offer to GreenTech startups. The second reason 
is related to the youth of this ecosystem. Since no clear actor has yet emerged in the 
ecosystem, various actors identify themselves as a reference in the ecosystem. 
Consequently, the exact services offered by each type of GreenTech actor are usually 
vague for GT startups.  
However, the roles of the various actors of the French GreenTech ecosystem could be 
identified thanks to the conducted interviews and the literature review. The three types 
of support offered by GT actors and needed by GT startups emerged from the 
interviews: Business support, Network and partnership, Technological support and 




startup which were defined in the literature review: Ideation, Creation, Seed, Scaling 
and Expansion. The TRL 1, 2 and 3 of the deeptech startup development (Straub, 2015) 
are also represented to signify the importance of Carnot Institutes and TTOs in the 
earliest stage of startup development. GT actors could be positioned on this scale 
according to the definition of literature, and with the findings of the interviews from 
both GT startups and GT actors. The combination of these two points of view – 
literature and interviews, gave rise to a more objective vision of the services offered 
by GT actors, which are depicted in the next figure. Nevertheless, it is important to 
keep in mind that it was necessary to make some generalities in order to have a clear 
vision of the GT ecosystem. Thus, it is possible that some specific GT actors offer 
some services which are not considered in the figure.  
 
Figure 10: GreenTech actors services along the stages of development of a startup 
 
As explained by prior studies, relationships and interactions between actors is as much 
important as the presence of these actors (Spigel, 2017). Findings of this study revealed 
that only a few actors interact with each other, and not in a regular way. One of the 
most striking results of this study comes from the place of competitive and 
technological poles in the ecosystem. Interviews revealed that they are strategic actors 
for GT startups because of the solid network they established. They have a precise 
knowledge of their ecosystem and can rapidly put GT startups in contact with 
incubators, Carnot Institutes or TTO, depending on the nature of their demand. 
Moreover, the literature review showed how crucial competitive and technological 




poles, central actors in the French GT ecosystem. However, the study also showed that 
incubators, Carnot Institutes and TTOs do not systematically re-direct the startup they 
encounter or support to competitive poles. More generally, they tend to neglect other 
actors and the benefits they could draw from possible partnerships. If incubators may 
try to help startup identify the right laboratory to answer their needs, no formal or 
recurrent partnership exist between them. These interactions between GreenTech 
actors are depicted in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11: GreenTech actors’ interactions 
 
6.1.2 Lacks in the GreenTech ecosystem 
Second, findings reveal that some GreenTech startups needs are not addressed by 
GreenTech actors. It appears that five needs and challenges evoked by GreenTech 
startups as crucial for them, were not taken into account by the GreenTech actors’ 
interviews, or not in a consistent way.  
The first one is related to the need for GreenTech startups to be part of a GreenTech 
startup community. GT startups particularly need this community because GT is still 
a young subject among startups: so, such startups need to exchange with their peers, 
to learn from each other in order to grow quicker, and to feel that others face the same 
problems as well. GT startups often talked about this desire whereas GT actors did not 
evoke it even once. This can be easily explained by the fact that GT actors have not 




acknowledging a clear growth of GT subjects in the projects they help, GT support in 
their overall activity is only recent: it usually accounts for a small part of their activity 
only, sometimes not even differentiated from their overall activity, and rarely their sole 
activity. Moreover, although the GreenTech Innovation network from the government 
is growing, it lacks visibility. 
Two other unaddressed challenges identified while interviewing GT startups are linked 
to the technology they develop and their research and development work. GT startups 
encounter problems when comes the question of Intellectual Property, with their 
partners: SATTs, TTOs or Carnot Institutes. GT startups want the entire property of 
their technology in order to use it autonomously and independently while their initial 
partner with whom or thanks to whom they developed this technology want to keep 
this IP. This can lead to abandoned partnerships or unsolved problems. The other 
problem for GT startups when developing their technology is the availability of 
infrastructures, equipment, laboratories, etc. For them, such infrastructures are crucial 
even after the first R&D phase, in order to test their solutions and then to scale up with 
industrial means. GT actors are aware of this need: incubators and competitive poles 
try to put startups in contact with laboratories or universities. However, GT actors also 
acknowledge that not enough platforms are available for startups to try their solution 
in their early stages and later pass the industrial phase.  
The two last challenges which are not enough considered by GT actors yet, are related 
to external factors: governmental regulations and acceptability of the new 
product/service by the customer. These two challenges were identified as real pain 
points by GT startups when they are ready to commercialize their products/services, 
whereas GT actors only evoked it when these specific needs were suggested during 
the interview. Even though they understand this need, they also seem not to be 
concerned. And indeed, GT startups usually feel helpless in front of these two 
challenges and would thus need more warning, formation and support, in order to be 






6.2 Managerial implications  
 
The findings of this study and their analysis in the previous section have a few 
implications for GT startups, GT actors and Bpifrance. The following section aims at 
providing some suggestions that these actors could execute to solidify the French 
GreenTech ecosystem. 
6.2.1 Recommendations for GreenTech startup 
GreenTech startups can get some new knowledge out of the results of this study.  
First, results from the interviews can be useful to newly created GreenTech ventures 
who are eager to apprehend the difficulties, obstacles and needs they will face 
throughout their whole development. More specifically, according to the findings, a 
problem that seems to be frequently overlooked by startups at the beginning of their 
development, but which is of utmost importance, is the question of Intellectual 
Property. Consequently, the best advice that could be given to new GT ventures – and 
more generally deeptech ventures since it became evident that their needs are very 
similar, is to raise the question of Intellectual Property as soon as possible with their 
various partners, to avoid any misunderstanding or future tensions and deceptions.   
Second, Figure 10 and Figure 11 are of particular interest for any GT startups looking 
for some clarity in the French GT ecosystem and willing to identify the best actor to 
contact in order to get the right support at the right time. If various actors argue to be 
able to offer business services, technical services or partnerships, only some of them 
can provide consistent support in each one of these categories, and these figures can 
be used as a guide to select the most appropriate ones. Moreover, ventures developing 
in regions or ventures wishing to address new market in regions, can now understand 
how crucial technological poles and competitive poles are. Thanks to their extended 
knowledge of their respective ecosystem but also thanks to their pertinent 
collaborations with other GT actors, they are undoubtedly the best interlocutors for GT 
startups in regions. A recommendation to GT startups would be to rapidly get in 
contact with the competitive or technological poles of their field in order to establish 




6.2.2 Recommendations for GreenTech actors 
Thanks to the findings of this study, GT actors can possibly get new insights about the 
challenges faced by GT startups and better understand the position they occupy in the 
startup development process. These insights can help them adapt their support to GT 
startups if they are willing to do so: they can refine their services according to the 
expectations of ventures. Figure 10 and Figure 11 are also of interest for them: they 
can indeed easily identify the actors to whom they can re-direct startups which have a 
particular need they may not be able to answer alone.  
More precise recommendations can also emerge from this study. The first one is that 
they should not consider GT startups as any other startups. If the findings showed that 
no specific “GreenTech” needs exist, interviews also showed that their needs were the 
same ones faced by deeptech startups. In this sense, GT startups are confronted with 
particular obstacles that must be considered by GT actors.  
The second one would be to create a GT community in their own structure or network. 
Since most French GT startups are still freshly created, only a few models and 
examples to follow exist. Thus, GT ventures have a higher need to meet each other in 
order to learn from their respective experiences. Findings of this study revealed that 
GT startups have an urgent need to be together and support each other. Although 
startups can meet each other from their own initiative, GT actors have the role to 
facilitate and encourage the creation of such communities: GT startups they support 
will therefore have higher chances to grow and foster the creation of other Gt ventures.  
The third recommendation might be more specific to incubators and technological or 
competitive poles. This suggestion deals with additional services and formation GT 
actors could offer to GT startups. As explained in the findings of this study, GT 
startups struggle to overcome the obstacles of governmental regulations and customer 
acceptability: they are sometimes unaware of them before addressing the market or do 
not have the right tools to address them. For this reason, incubators and poles might 
consider strengthening their support on these two particular aspects, through 
workshops or by establishing strategic relations with other actors (lawyers for 
instance). The other service which becomes rare, according to some GT startups and 




the various stages of the startup development. For newly created incubators or 
incubators willing to develop a focus on GT startups, the creation of such platforms or 
infrastructures in their facilities would be extremely useful. If this is not possible, 
especially because such platforms can be very expensive, startups and poles absolutely 
have to develop more partnerships with facilities offering this service. As explained 
before, partnerships between incubators and laboratories are rare, whereas they could 
alleviate this lack of industrial tools. 
Finally, if GT actors truly wishes to improve their support to GT startups, they should 
measure the impact of their action and support, in order to identify margins of 
improvement and how they can increase and complete their offers. These 
measurements can encompass key performance indicators such as the number of GT 
startups supported, the number of GT startups who are still “alive” after several years, 
etc. but also more qualitative indicators such as comments, suggestions and 
evaluations from the ventures they support.  
6.2.3 Recommendations for Bpifrance 
Bpifrance, as much as GT actors and GT startups can use  Figure 10 and Figure 11 in 
order to have a clearer understanding of the French GT ecosystem and how actors are 
interrelated. This mapping can be of interest for further strategy plans to develop this 
ecosystem, and to help GT startups. 
Indeed, Bpifrance wishes to know how she can support GT startups and more generally 
the GT ecosystem. This smaller section suggests some actions that could be conducted 
by Bpifrance and which could improve, complete or solidify the French GT ecosystem. 
First, results of the interviews demonstrated that GT actors do not always have a 
precise idea of the GreenTech definition and its implications. Moreover, they 
sometimes ignore the challenges GT startups face. Most of them do not give a 
particular attention to the “GreenTech” sector, especially Carnot Institutes and TTOs 
whereas they are the institutions where the new “green technologies” are developed. 
For these reasons, if Bpifrance wants to see an increase in the number of GT startups 
created, she has an important effort of formation and sensibilization about GreenTech 




Formation and sensibilization could also be useful for GreenTech startups who want 
to understand the French ecosystem better. This study can be a basis for Bpifrance to 
write a note for GreenTech startups so that they can easily identify GT actors. 
Another straightforward implication from the findings of this study, is the need to 
create a GreenTech community. As previously explained, GreenTech startup have an 
urgent desire to share their experiences. Since Bpifrance finance most GreenTech 
startups in France, it seems reasonable for her to take this role of a community leader. 
Events regrouping GreenTech startups would be a good first step, and Bpifrance 
already demonstrated she has the means to organize impactful events. Moreover, to 
foster the creation of GreenTech ventures, the “GreenTech” culture in France needs to 
grow (Spigel, 2017). Significant communication campaigns could be deployed to 
spread success stories of GreenTech startups and to distillate more GreenTech 
knowledge. 
Results of the study also proved that the GT network was not yet sufficiently 
developed. Connections between GT actors are rare, whereas prior studies underlined 
how essential interactions were, for an ecosystem to be efficient (Spigel, 2017). The 
most urgent interconnections to create are between incubators and laboratories (TTOs, 
Carnot Institute, etc.). It is evident that the lack of such partnerships hinders the 
development of GreenTech startups. To encourage interactions and communication 
between incubators and laboratories, Bpifrance could fund programs aiming at 
establishing partnerships between these actors. Indeed, GT actors usually see such 
relations as a waste of time, and they must see an advantage for them to make this 
effort. 
More generally, more connections should be established between GT actors. The 
GreenTech Innovation network launched by the government is still young, small, 
fragile and develops only slowly. Nevertheless, Bpifrance cannot take the role of a 
new agent of connections between GT actors because of the already opacity of the 
ecosystem. A new actor taking a position of intermediary would only increase this 
effect. Hence, a solution could be to support this network by offering grants and 
rewards for newly formed partnerships between actors, and by organizing special 




6.1 Theoretical implications  
 
This study also contributes to prior academic literature. Prior literature regarding 
GreenTech startups specific needs can be contrasted by the findings of this empirical 
research.  
The first research question addressed GreenTech startups specific needs compared to 
other startups. Prior studies identified three grand categories of GreenTech startups 
specific needs: 1) the need for a lot of money (Baltes & Büchele, 2015), preferably 
non-dilutive money, and for a long time because of the capitalistic nature of GT 
startups and a very long time-to-market (Silverberg, 2015), 2) the need for a specific 
support in developing new technologies (Hao, 2018) and adapting them to existing 
restrictive regulations (Herweijer & Azhar, 2020),  3) the need for a strong and 
supportive ecosystem, required by the two precedent needs (Hoff, 2012). However, 
these needs were already identified for deeptech startups  (Bpifrance, 2019) and no 
need which would be only related to GreenTech startups could be identified. Thus, this 
study did not aim at validating or invalidating hypotheses but explored the needs faced 
by GreenTech startups in order to identify the presence or the absence of specific needs 
for GreenTech startups.  
Findings confirm that the three types of needs identified in prior literature are indeed 
faced by GreenTech startups Gt startups have to spend a lot of time, looking for money 
and they have to raise more money than regular startups because their research requires 
expensive infrastructures and a lot of time. Consequently, they look for specific 
support, and rely a lot on subventions and public help. Moreover, because they develop 
new technologies, GreenTech startups need some specific support and specific 
infrastructures. They also need help to decipher existing regulations and overcome 
them or to identify the right market, the right country which will welcome a new, 
disruptive technology. Finally, the need for a structured and complete ecosystem is 
intense because of all these challenges: a coordinated support from the government, 
laboratories, incubators is crucial. Additionally, GreenTech startups look for a strong 





This study also shows that GreenTech startups do not have specific needs compared 
to other startups, or more exactly, they have the same specific needs as deeptech 
startups. The needs which were developed in the previous paragraph are the same ones 








This study aimed at offering a clearer vision of the French GreenTech ecosystem in 
order to understand how GreenTech actors are supporting the creation of GreenTech 
startups, and how this support could be improved. Based on qualitative research on 
GreenTech actors & startups, it can be argued that lacks in the support to GreenTech 
startups exist but could be addressed thanks to a more cooperative ecosystem. 
The French GreenTech ecosystem is still opaque for both GreenTech actors and 
GreenTech startups. The plurality of actors and services as well as the vague 
comprehension of the “GreenTech” definition explain this opacity. 
GreenTech startups face, like any other startups, needs and challenges. They do not 
face specific “GreenTech” obstacles, but they do meet challenges which are specific 
to DeepTech startups: finding large amounts of money, overcoming regulations and 
prejudices. They also struggle to find the right infrastructures for their R&D 
development in their scale-up phase and wish to feel part of a GreenTech community.  
GreenTech actors offer regular services to GreenTech startups: business support, 
technical help, funds, networking. However, GreenTech actors do not necessarily 
tailor their support to GreenTech startups: they do not always make a difference 
between them and other startups or other companies. Moreover, the cooperation and 
partnerships between different GreenTech actors seems to be feeble, thus exacerbating 
the opacity of the ecosystem and the difficulty for startups to overcome challenges. 
Although Competitive and Technological Poles usually have a clear understanding of 
their ecosystem and usually interact a lot with all actors, interactions between other 
actors are rarely as efficient or as regular. 
Therefore, to improve their support to GreenTech startups, GT actors must be more 
aware of the specificity and needs of GreenTech startups, but also formalize their 
infrastructures to GT startups to evaluate and improve it. More interactions and 
collaborations between them could also help addressing the identified lacks in their 
offerings. More cooperation between them could indeed help GT startups to feel part 
of a GreenTech community, in a clearer ecosystem, and would definitely facilitate the 




R&D industrial infrastructures should be available, so that GT startups can scale up 
more easily. 
The findings are relevant for both actors and startups. The results of the study can help 
them better understand the role of each GT actor and to have an overview of the French 
GreenTech ecosystem. GT startups can discern the services they can have access to 
and with which actors. GT actors willing to improve their support to GT startups can 
prioritize their actions, based on the GT startups needs and the lacks in their support 
which were identified. 
This research work presents a few limitations which must be considered. First, the 
research relies on a qualitative data analysis, with subjective interviews as the primary 
data. Consequently, answers collected among interviewees only mirrors their own 
perspectives and points of views. Thus, they do not engage the company or laboratory 
they are attached to.  
Furthermore, differences exist between two SATT/Incubators/Competitive 
Poles/Technological Poles/Carnot Institutes/TTOs. 2 actors of the same category do 
not necessarily have the same approach to support startups, or do not offer the exact 
same services. As a consequence, the list of services described in this study is not 
exhaustive, and the recommendations might not be applicable to all GT actors. 
Finally, the interviews of GreenTech startups were conducted by a third party, and the 
analysis of these interviews in the present research work only relied on notes taken by 
the interviewer. Thus, some statements from GT startups might have been 
misinterpreted. Moreover, only startups from the “Mobility” and “Agriculture & 
Agrifood” sectors were interviewed. The needs and challenges which were identified 
in this study might be specific to startups evolving in these two environments, and not 
be representative of all GT startups. 
Following the results of this research, several proposals for future research on the 
GreenTech ecosystem in France could be developed. First, the sample of GreenTech 
startups interviewed only focused on two GreenTech sectors. Therefore, futures 
studies could examine GT startups from other sectors, in order to confirm the absence 




Second, to further help startups to identify the right actors throughout their 
development stages, more precise mappings of actors and the detailed services they 
offer to startups could be elaborated. A mapping of this nature, for each one of the six 
GreenTech sectors would be of direct interest and use for GreenTech startups. 
Third, this study considered “GreenTech” as an independent sector. It could be worth 
questioning this position. Instead of seeing GT as an independent sector, GreenTech 
could be considered as a characteristic of every sector, or as part of other sectors. 
Future research works could investigate both point of views: one GreenTech sector or 
Greentech as part of other sectors; because it changes the ecosystem which is 
considered. In order to initiate a true energetic and environmental transition, it might 
be indeed more efficient to think of GreenTech as a characteristic of other “tech 
sectors”, so that each industrial sector can make its transition. 
As a conclusion, this study gives an overview of the GreenTech ecosystem in France 
and provides a mapping of GreenTech actors to clarify their role in the development 
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Appendix: Interview guide  
 
Introduction 
- Structure of the interview and permission to record the interview. Anonymity, 
confidentiality, right to withdraw. 
- Introduction of the topic and thesis 
- Background: title/position, brief description of the structure (geographic 
position, stage of the startup) 
 
Context 
-  What is the role of startup support within all activities of the organization? 
- In what type of startups do you focus? How important are GT startups for you? 
- If a company approaches you, what indicators do you use to determine whether 
it fits your criteria for a) startup b) GT startup? 
- Since when startups/GT startups have been part of your activities? 
 
Intervention and mechanisms 
Your role as a GreenTech actor 
- At which step of the startup do you “step in”? (Ideation, creation, seed, etc.)  
- Which need do you identify for GT startups?  
GreenTech ecosystem 
- Which other services than yours, do GT startups use? 
- Which other actors are relevant to you? With which ones do you actively 
cooperate with? With which one do you feel a particular need to be 
coordinated with? 
- Do you work with incubators/SATTs/OTTs/Technological or competitive 
poles/Carnot Institutes? 
- Do you think the current ecosystem is relevant for GT startups?  






- How do you evaluate your support to GT startups? How do you know if your 
services were useful? 
- When it comes to GT startups, did you see an evolution in the past 5 years in 
terms of numbers, type of projects? Did you take it into account in your 
accompaniment strategy? Or do you plan to take it into account? How? 
 
